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“SACRIFICE ZONES” IN THE GREEN ENERGY
ECONOMY: TOWARD AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
FRAMEWORK
Dayna Nadine Scott and Adrian A. Smith*
T

he environmental justice movement validates the
grassroots struggles of residents of places which Steve Lerner refers to as “sacrifice zones”: low-income and racialized
communities shouldering more than their fair share of environmental harms related to pollution, contamination, toxic waste, and heavy industry. On this account, disparities in
wealth and power, often inscribed and re-inscribed through
social processes of racialization, are understood to produce
disparities in environmental burdens. Here, we attempt to
understand how these dynamics are shifting in the green
energy economy under settler colonial capitalism. We consider the possibility that the political economy of green energy contains its own sacrifice zones. Drawing on preliminary empirical research undertaken in southwestern Ontario in 2015, we document local resistance to renewable
energy projects. Residents mounted campaigns against
wind turbines based on suspected health effects and
against solar farms based on arable land and food justice
concerns, and in both cases, grounded their resistance in a
generalized claim, which might be termed a “right to landscape”. We conclude that this resistance, contrary to typical
framings which dismiss it as NIMBYism, has resonances
with broader claims about environmental justice and may
signal larger structural shifts worth devoting scholarly attention to. In the end, however, we do not wholly accept the
sacrifice zone characterization of this resistance either, as
our analysis reveals it to be far more complex and ambiguous than such a framing allows. But we maintain that taking this resistance seriously, rather than treating it as
merely obstructionist to a transition away from fossil capitalism, reveals a counter-hegemonic potential at its core.
There are seeds in this resistance with the power to push
back on the deepening of capitalist relations that would
otherwise be ushered in by an uncritical embrace of “green
energy” enthusiasm.

*

L

e mouvement de justice environnementale confirme
les luttes populaires des résidents des lieux que Steve Lerner qualifie de « zones sacrifiées » : communautés racisées à
faibles revenus qui assument plus de leur juste part de préjudices environnementaux associés à la pollution, la contamination, les déchets toxiques et l’industrie lourde. À ce
propos, les écarts de richesse et de pouvoir, souvent inscrits
et réinscrits à travers les processus sociaux de racialisation,
sont compris comme produisant des disparités au niveau
des charges environnementales. Cet article tente de comprendre la façon dont ces dynamiques changent au sein de
l’économie de l’énergie verte sous le capitalisme colonial.
Nous considérons la possibilité que l’économie politique de
l’énergie verte contienne ses propres zones sacrifiées. En
nous basant sur une recherche empirique préliminaire menée dans le Sud-Ouest de l’Ontario en 2015, nous documentons l’opposition locale aux projets d’énergie renouvelable.
Des résidents ont mené des campagnes contre des éoliennes, suspectant des effets néfastes sur la santé, et
contre des panneaux solaires installés sur des terres
arables, sur la base de préoccupations de justice alimentaire, fondant leur opposition dans les deux cas sur une revendication générale, qu’on pourrait définir comme un
« droit au paysage ». Nous concluons que cette opposition,
contrairement aux représentations typiques l’associant au
phénomène de « pas dans ma cour », fait écho aux revendications plus larges de justice environnementale et peut signifier un changement structurel plus global valant la
peine d’être étudié par les chercheurs. Toutefois, au final,
nous n’acceptons non plus entièrement la caractérisation de
« zone sacrifiée » employée par ce mouvement de résistance,
puisque notre analyse révèle qu’elle est bien plus complexe
et ambigüe que ne le permet une telle représentation. Mais
nous maintenons que le fait de prendre ce mouvement de
résistance au sérieux, plutôt que de le traiter comme
s’opposant simplement à une transition vers des alternatives au capitalisme fossile, révèle en soi un potentiel antihégémonique. Cette opposition sème des graines ayant le
pouvoir de repousser l’intensification des relations capitalistes qui seraient autrement établies par l’adhésion sans
réserve de l’enthousiasme de « l’énergie verte ».
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University. The authors would like to recognize with thanks the expert research assistance provided by Osgoode joint MES/JD student Amanda Spitzig in the preparation of this article.
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Introduction
In this article, we examine the tensions and conflicts between movements for climate justice, energy justice, and food justice, as they are
emerging on the ground in the global North by taking seriously resistance
struggles against renewable energy projects. We begin from the premise
that climate justice requires consideration not only of whether to tackle
climate change by transitioning from a fossil fuel economy, but more profoundly of how to undertake that transition. In other words, there are,
and will continue to be, distributional effects related to renewable energy
generation. Critical environmental justice scholars need to attend to those
effects as they emerge, with a focus on social dynamics, including race,
class, gender, and settler colonialism.1
The environmental justice movement validates the grassroots struggles of residents of places which Steve Lerner refers to as “sacrifice zones”:
low-income and racialized communities shouldering more than their fair
share of environmental harms related to pollution, contamination, toxic
waste and heavy industry.2 On this account, disparities in wealth and
power, often inscribed and re-inscribed through social processes of racialization, are understood to produce disparities in environmental burdens.
Here, we attempt to understand how these dynamics are shifting in the
green energy economy. In doing so, we join scholars in political ecology
who are asking provocative questions “that confound the general understanding of environmental justice” as following a standard formula based
on grassroots, “bottom-up” community reactions by people of colour in
low-income neighbourhoods.3 We seek to better understand how critical
environmental justice scholars should receive and theorize resistance that
breaks this mold. Specifically, how should we react to movements of
white, middle-class property owners articulating claims that resonate
1

“Critical Environmental Justice Studies” is a term adopted by David Pellow and Robert
Brulle to refer to emerging scholarship, which attempts to incorporate attention to “how
multiple social categories of difference are entangled in the production of environmental
injustice,” among other critical interventions (see respectively David Naguib Pellow &
Robert J Brulle, “Power, Justice, and the Environment: Toward Critical Environmental
Justice Studies” in David Naguib Pellow & Robert J Brulle, eds, Power, Justice, and the
Environment: A Critical Appraisal of the Environmental Justice Movement (Cambridge,
Mass: MIT Press, 2005) 1; David N Pellow, “Toward a Critical Environmental Justice
Studies: Black Lives Matter as an Environmental Justice Challenge” (2016) 13:2 Du
Bois Rev 221 at 223).

2

See Steve Lerner, Sacrifice Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the
United States (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010) at 3.

3

Peter C Little, “Environmental Justice Discomfort and Disconnect in IBM’s Tainted
Birthplace: A Micropolitical Ecology Perspective” (2012) 23:3 Capital Nature Socialism
92 at 97. See also Julian Agyeman, Sustainable Communities and the Challenge of Environmental Justice (New York: New York University Press, 2005) at 1–2.
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with the values and aims that have motivated the environmental justice
movement? What do we mean by “Environmental Justice for All”?4 Our
study is based on preliminary empirical research employing qualitative
methods undertaken in southwestern Ontario from April to August 2015.
We conducted comprehensive key-informant interviews and participant
observation with local residents and advocates to learn more about their
concerns and resistance efforts in relation to renewable energy projects.5
The data gathered through these methods were supplemented by a thorough review of the publicly available documentary record. We organized
our examination of the contours of local resistance to green energy according to the way in which local residents and activists articulated those
claims. For wind turbines, the concerns centered primarily on suspected
adverse health effects; for solar farms, the concerns were expressed primarily in relation to the loss of arable land and food justice. In both cases,
resistance was grounded in a generalized claim which might be termed a
“right to landscape”.
The question of NIMBYism6 and environmental justice was very much
a part of the energy landscape in southwestern Ontario in the years preceding our study. In an example that culminated in a high profile political
controversy, the provincial government reversed a siting decision, which
would have placed two new gas plants in the “backyards” of the largely

4

See e.g. Environmental Justice Health Alliance for Chemical Policy Reform, Environmental Justice for All, online: <ej4all.org>.

5

We conducted six in-depth interviews with key informants identified first by local news
media sources as local residents or activists with concerns about renewable energy projects, and subsequently through a snowball method. Two interviews were conducted
with multiple informants present. In one case, we were invited to observe a meeting of
several residents and activists. The interviews were approximately ninety minutes in
length and were taped and transcribed. To preserve confidentiality, we anonymized the
identities of the interview subjects, but specified the date and location of each interview.
We also reviewed local media sources, as well as court and tribunal proceedings where
available. We analyzed data through a process of analytic induction, identified three
“themes” or types of claims, and selected quotes where illustrative of the points in discussion.

6

The term “NIMBYism” refers to “not-in-my-backyard” syndrome. Definitions vary, but
in general “NIMBYism” is used to refer to refusals to accept local impacts from the kind
of development that would otherwise be supported if it were located elsewhere (see e.g.
Maarten Wolsink, “Invalid Theory Impedes Our Understanding: A Critique on the Persistence of the Language of NIMBY” (2006) 31:1 Transactions Institute British Geographers 85 at 86 [Wolsink, “NIMBY”]; Karena Shaw et al, “Conflicted or Constructive?
Exploring Community Responses to New Energy Developments in Canada” (2015) 8
Energy Research & Social Science 41 at 42).
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privileged people of Oakville, Ontario.7 Katie Daubs, a journalist covering
the well-organized resistance of the community quipped:
They may have more flat screen televisions than the average
person, but the citizens of Oakville are human beings. If you prick
them, they will bleed. If you wrong them, they will seek revenge. If
you try to build a power plant next to a residential zone, they will fly
in Erin Brockovich.8

Most environmental justice struggles are narratives of solidarity, but occasionally, as in Peter Little’s example of IBM’s legacy of a toxic “vapor intrusion” in primarily white Endicott, New York, there are stories of “contestation, discomfort, [and] disconnect”: contexts in which traditional environmental justice framings chafe.9 In this study, we confront not only
the relative privilege of the affected communities, but the fact that the industry they oppose—renewable energy—is itself promoted and statesanctioned in “climate justice” terms. In other words, this is not merely a
situation of relatively privileged residents fighting a proposed energy project that could easily be framed as an environmental burden in the classic
“sacrifice zone” sense, but rather one in which the kind of projects being
proposed (and opposed) are those meant to assist in the transition away
from fossil fuels, momentum towards a destination in which gas plants
are “not in anyone’s backyard” (NIABY).10

7

To further complicate the matter from an environmental justice perspective, in an effort
to compensate the companies affected by the decision to cancel the plants, “the government gave each of them a new contract to build a plant somewhere else” (Adrian Morrow, “Ontario Liberals’ Gas-Plants Scandal: Everything You Need to Know”, The Globe
and Mail (1 April 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>). One gas plant ended up
in the small town of Napanee, Ontario and the other in Lambton County, near Sarnia,
which—according to the World Health Organization—already bears the burden of the
worst air quality in the country, due to the presence of Canada’s “Chemical Valley” (see
Tara Jeffrey, “Sarnia’s Air Canada’s Worst” Sarnia Observer (27 September 2011),
online: <www.theobserver.ca>). In fact, the neighboring Aamjiwnaang First Nation recently
withdrew a Charter challenge against the Ministry of Environment in Ontario, in which
they claimed that the high air pollution burden affected them disproportionately as
First Nations people (see Lockridge v Ontario (Director, Ministry of the Environment),
2012 ONSC 2316, 350 DLR (4th) 720 (Div Ct)); Margot Venton et al, “Changing Course
in Chemical Valley” (26 April 2016), Ecojustice, online: <www.ecojustice.ca>).

8

Katie Daubs, “Oakville Brings in Erin Brockovich to Fight Power Plant”, Toronto Star
(1 October 2010), online: <www.thestar.com>. Brockovich, of course, is the legendary
environmental justice crusader depicted in the film Erin Brockovich directed by Steven
Soderbergh (2003).

9

Little, supra note 3 at 95, 105.

10

The notion of “just sustainabilities” popularized by Julian Agyeman and his colleagues
is an attempt to have scholars focus on not only the distribution of risk, but also the
prevention of risks. This notion is sometimes captured by the “NIABY” acronym. This
framework is a little more difficult to apply in the context of green energy projects, in-
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I. Sacrifice Zones
In the sacrifice zones of the industrialized global North, we find the
“downwinders”: residents of pollution hot spots who live downwind and
downstream of large industrial complexes of extraction, refining, and petrochemical production, and who suffer the environmental health effects
that go with it. These downwinders are the people whose experiences and
resistance has occupied the focus of much of environmental justice research to date.11 In classic conceptions, residents of sacrifice zones are
members of low-income and racialized communities shouldering more
than their fair share of environmental burdens.12 In one sense, then, the
term “sacrifice zone” is “a trope used to describe disadvantaged communities and landscapes disproportionately contaminated and neglected in the
name of capital accumulation.”13 More recently, scholars have started to
more directly attribute the injustice of the lives of those residing in sacrifice zones to “fossil extractivism”, and to brand their resistance as a fight
for “climate justice”.14 Participants in the resistance movement include

tended as an alternative to the damaging conventional fossil fuel sources of generating
energy (see generally Julian Agyeman, Robert D Bullard & Bob Evans, eds, Just Sustainabilities: Development in an Unequal World (London: Earthscan, 2003)).
11

See e.g. Luke W Cole & Sheila R Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism
and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement (New York: New York University
Press, 2001) at 19–33; Phil Brown, “Popular Epidemiology and Toxic Waste Contamination: Lay and Professional Ways of Knowing” (1992) 33:3 J Health & Social Behavior
267 [Brown, “Ways of Knowing”]; Phil Brown, “Popular Epidemiology Revisited” (1997)
45:3 Current Sociology 137; Giovanna Di Chiro, “Environmental Justice from the
Grassroots: Reflections on History, Gender and Expertise” in Daniel Faber, ed, The
Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Environmental Justice Movements in the United
States (New York: Guildford Press, 1998) at 104; Richard Hofrichter, ed, Toxic Struggles: The Theory and Practice of Environmental Justice (Philadelphia: New Society,
1993); Dara O’Rourke & Gregg P Macey, “Community Environmental Policing: Assessing New Strategies of Public Participation in Environmental Regulation” (2003)
22:3 J Policy Analysis & Management 383; Dayna Nadine Scott, “Confronting Chronic
Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution” (2008) 46:2 Osgoode Hall LJ
293; Peggy M Shepard et al, “Preface: Advancing Environmental Justice through
Community-Based Participatory Research” (2002) 110 (supp 2) Environmental Health
Perspectives 139.

12

For a seminal work on environmentalism and social justice, see generally Robert D
Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (Boulder, Colo:
Westview Press, 1990).

13

Peter C Little, “On the Micropolitics and Edges of Survival in a Technocapital Sacrifice
Zone”, online: (2016) Capitalism Nature Socialism 1 at 2 <http://www.tandfonline.
com/loi/rcns>.

14

See generally David Schlosberg & Lisette B Collins, “From Environmental to Climate
Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice” (2014) 5:3
WIREs Climate Change 359; Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, supra note 10; Paul Mohai,
David Pellow & J Timmons Roberts, “Environmental Justice” (2009) 34 Annual Rev
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people like Vanessa, a young Anishinaabe woman who lives on the Aamjiwnaang First Nation reserve, downwind of Canada’s Chemical Valley in
southwestern Ontario, and has been photographed with a placard that
reads, “This is what environmental racism looks like.”15 The movement
also includes people like Carmen, a former “oilman” who took up ranching
just north of Peace River, Alberta when the emissions from bitumen extraction pushed his father into illness and off the land.16 In describing how
the tar sands operators were drawing volatile hydrocarbons to the surface
with a new process, and heating these hydrocarbons in open tanks so that
they would waft down the valley, knocking people and cattle to their
knees, Carmen stated, “we’re being gassed out here and nobody cares.”17
In this article, we turn our minds to the sacrifice zones created in the
wake of green energy enthusiasm. In our conception, green energy enthusiasm constitutes not only the policy imperative to demonstrate progress
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus a mandate to move away
from fossil extractivism, but also the deliberate decisions taken by governmental authorities to remove the kinds of procedural protections and
democratic controls that have become standard in relation to more conventional energy projects.18 These decisions, we argue here, contribute to
a striking resonance between the narratives of residents affected by green
energy projects, most notably by wind turbines, and those in the sacrifice
zones of fossil capitalism. Residents in the two types of sacrifice zone articulate a shared sense that they are bearing all of the risks and reaping
few of the rewards.

Environment & Resources 405; David Schlosberg, “Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political Theories” (2004) 13:3 Environmental Politics 517.
15

This narrative draws on fieldwork conducted for Dayna Nadine Scott’s previous research (see Dayna Nadine Scott, “‘We Are the Monitors Now’: Experiential Knowledge,
Transcorporeality and Environmental Justice” (2016) 25:3 Soc & Leg Stud 261 [Scott,
“Monitors Now”]). See also Michael Toledano, “A Toxic Tour of Canada’s Chemical Valley”, VICE (23 March 2013), online: <www.vice.com>; Aamjiwnaang and Sarnia Against
Pipeline (ASAP), Aamjiwnaang Solidarity Against Chemical Valley, online: <aamjiwnaangsolidarity.com>.

16

See also Scott, “Monitors Now”, supra note 15; Micheal Toledano, “Albertans Are Abandoning Their Homes Due to Toxic Air”, VICE (20 February 2014), online: <www.
vice.com>.

17

Interview of Carmen (24 July 2014, Peace River, Alta). See also Scott, “Monitors Now”,
supra note 15 at 267.

18

Our point here is not to valorize conventional procedural protections and controls. Indeed, there are important criticisms directed at these (see e.g. Robert B Gibson, “In Full
Retreat: The Canadian Government’s New Environmental Assessment Law Undoes
Decades of Progress” (2012) 30:3 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 179).
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A. The Policy Imperatives Driving the Shift to Renewables
In this “post-Paris” world,19 climate change is regarded as a top policy
priority. Governments all the world over are striving to be seen as making
measurable progress toward the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Accordingly, Canadian provinces have adopted a range of policy
measures with the stated aim of combatting climate change. The most notable examples are British Columbia’s well-established carbon tax,20 Alberta’s more recent carbon levy,21 Ontario’s Green Energy Act, 2009, establishing a feed-in tariff,22 as well as the cap-and-trade regime for greenhouse gas emissions implemented in Quebec.23 A federal mandate also exists for imposing a pan-Canadian carbon price.24 All of these policy
measures incorporate an accounting for greenhouse gas emissions intended to facilitate the transition away from fossil fuels. Massive new investments are occurring in renewables, such as solar and wind generation, as
well as in hydro dam and nuclear refurbishment projects. In this latter
respect, highly contested projects with serious adverse environmental effects, like British Columbia’s Site C Dam, Newfoundland’s Muskrat Falls,
and the Deep Geological Repository for spent nuclear fuels near the Bruce
Peninsula in Ontario, are now billed as “green energy” initiatives.25
19

See Paris Agreement, 22 April 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016), COP 21 Report, Addendum at 21–36, online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/
10a01.pdf>. The agreement provides that each signatory nation will designate their
greenhouse gas reduction goals as nationally determined commitments. The signatory
states are then expected to adopt corresponding domestic climate change policies. As an
example, Canada’s first nationally determined commitment pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by thirty percent below 2005 levels by 2030 (see “Canada’s INDC
Submission to the UNFCCC”, online: United Nations Framework on Climate Change
<www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Canada%20First/INDC%20-%20
Canada%20-%20English.pdf>).

20

See Carbon Tax Act, SBC 2008, c 40.

21

See Climate Leadership Act, SA 2016, c C-16.9.

22

See Green Energy Act, 2009, SO 2009, c 12, Schedule A (formerly the Green Energy and
Green Economy Act, 2009). For background on the Feed-in Tariff Program which Ontario launched in conjunction with the Green Energy Act, 2009, see e.g. Independent Electricity System Operator, “Ontario’s Feed-in Tariff Program Backgrounder” (16 December 2009), online: IESO <www.ieso.ca> [IESO, “Feed-in Tariff Program”].

23

See Ministère du développement durable, Environnement et Lutte contre les changements climatiques, “The Québec Cap and Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Allowances”, online: MDDELCC <www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/
Systeme-plafonnement-droits-GES-en.htm>.

24

See Shawn McCarthy, “Tory MPs Take Aim at Liberals’ Carbon Price Plan”, The Globe
and Mail (19 September 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>.

25

See respectively Adrian Dix, “Christy Clark’s Big Sales Job on Site C”, The Tyee
(12 October 2016), online: <www.thetyee.ca>; Garret Barry, “Ball Pitches Green N.L.
Power to American Governors”, CBC News (29 August 2016), online <www.cbc.ca>; On-
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In the context of growing green energy enthusiasm, we consider the
possibility that, as political economist Simon Dalby puts it, “those that
manage to connect to this new political economy are distinguished from
those dispossessed and displaced by its voracious appetite for resources
and land.”26 In fact, as we argue elsewhere in the context of the Site C
dam project, it is possible to conceive of the residents of these new sacrifice zones as climate refugees of a different kind.27 In contrast to the images conjured by the alarmist mainstream discourse of rising sea levels
causing brown and black bodies to wash up on “our” shores, these climate
refugees are dispossessed and displaced not by climate change itself, nor
by its devastating impacts, but rather by government actions to mitigate
it. The category of “climate refugee” thus might include both those literally displaced and, in Rob Nixon’s terms, those displaced “without moving”—those struck by “a loss that leaves communities stranded in a place
stripped of the very characteristics that made it inhabitable” for them in
the past.28 In the case of the massive Site C dam, aiming to harness the
power of the Peace River, the project receives green energy billing even
though it will likely flood traplines and historic fishing spots on the traditional territory of the Treaty 8 First Nations.29 The “new” climate refugees, then, would include marginalized peoples displaced within the global North by a rising tide of renewable energy enthusiasm inattentive to
environmental justice.
In the next part, we detail the resistance to renewable energy projects
which we observed on the ground in southwestern Ontario in 2015. The
kinds of effects that are associated with the green energy projects we describe do not produce widespread dispossession or displacement, as the
projects are largely small- and medium-scale wind and solar installations
located in rural areas. Nor are the people mobilizing against the projects,
in most cases, members of racialized or marginalized communities. In
fact, they are mostly white, propertied citizens of rural areas. But it is

tario Power Generation, “What Is the Deep Geologic Repository (DGR)?” (2016), online:
OPG <opgdgr.com/>.
26

Simon Dalby, “Environmental Geopolitics in the Twenty-first Century” (2014) 39:1 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 3 at 13.

27

See generally Dayna Nadine Scott & Adrian A Smith, “The Abstract Subject of the Climate Migrant: Displaced by the Rising Tides of the Green Energy Economy” (2017) 8:1
J Human Rights & Environment 30 at 31.

28

Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 2011) at 19.

29

See BC Hydro, “FAQ”, Site C Clean Energy Project, online: <www.sitecproject.com/faq>;
Sierra Club BC, Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative & Peace Valley Environment Association, “Site C Report” (2013), online: <sierraclub.bc.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2015/08/Site-C-Report_low-res.pdf>.
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possible to conceive of the people resisting these projects as residents of
sacrifice zones in the conceptual sense, as they confront a state-imposed
policy imperative that is justified in terms of the common good, but for
which they believe their interests are being sacrificed. As mentioned, a
critical aspect of green energy enthusiasm is the policy imperative to
transition from fossil extractivism, paired with deliberate decisions by
governmental authorities to forgo standard procedural protections, avenues for democratic deliberation, and local control.
A key aim of this exercise is to sharpen our analytical tools as environmental justice scholars within transitional terrain. The green energy
economy ushers in an era which, in many cases, we have been agitating
for. And yet, troubling signs suggest that not much has changed at a fundamental level, in terms of the underlying set of relations driving environmental injustice.30 In this article, we consider whether those who resist
green energy projects can be conceived as residents of sacrifice zones, taking their claims seriously and asking the hard questions raised by their
objections to renewable energy projects, so as to sharpen our analytic tools
for the coming shift.31 We hope the exercise can advance understanding of
how scholars should approach this resistance in a way that is attentive to
the core commitments of environmental justice scholarship.
30

This is not an entirely new phenomenon. In fact, sacrifice zones have been created
across the global South. More recently, the “flexibility mechanisms” of the Kyoto Protocol treated carbon as a commodity (see Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 162 arts 6, 12 (entered
into force 16 February 2005)). “Joint implementation” tools established under the Kyoto
Protocol, including the clean development mechanism, provided incentives for nations
of the global North to “offset” their greenhouse gas emissions by investing in carbon sequestration and renewable energy projects in developing countries (with palm oil plantations being a key site of resistance) (see ibid, art 12). See also Emily Boyd, “Governing
the Clean Development Mechanism: Global Rhetoric Versus Local Realities in Carbon
Sequestration Projects” (2009) 41:10 Environment & Planning A 2380. For examples focusing on wind power specifically, see Shalanda H Baker, “Project Finance and Sustainable Development in the Global South” in Shawkat Alam et al, eds, International
Environmental Law and the Global South (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2015) 338. As Baker makes clear, “going green” has been a neoliberal project all along.
She describes how Mexico’s 2008 Renewable Energy Law eased the way for private investment, which erased communal ownership over lands according to the ejido system.
Large wind farm developers pressured local farmers to sign long-term leases and all of
the power generated was sold exclusively to multinational cement producers, beverage
companies, or Walmart (see ibid at 343).

31

In a similar vein, Beatriz Bustos, Mauricio Folchi and Maria Fragkou ask, “If the essence of injustice is disenfranchisement, if what generates environmental injustice is
the decision-making system, we question whether a group that is not marginal, from a
racial or economic point of view, can be the object of environmental injustice” (Beatriz
Bustos, Mauricio Folchi & Maria Fragkou, “Coal Mining on Pastureland in Southern
Chile: Challenging Recognition and Participation as Guarantees for Environmental
Justice” (2016) 84 Geoforum 292 at 296).
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II. Resistance to Green Energy Projects in Ontario
The emergence of Ontario’s green energy economy began around 2005,
and was cemented with the enactment of the Green Energy Act, 200932.
The purposes of the act include “fostering the growth of renewable energy
projects, which use cleaner sources of energy,” “removing barriers to and
promoting opportunities for renewable energy projects,” and “promoting a
green economy.”33 The legislation streamlined the planning and environmental approval processes for renewable energy projects, establishing a
separate environmental assessment category, and transferring decisionmaking authority from municipalities to the provincial government.34 Renewable energy projects in Ontario, beginning with wind turbines and
eventually including solar farms, though broadly supported in principle
across the province, were met with fierce resistance by local communities.
This resistance was immediately branded as NIMBYism in policy circles,
and seen as stemming from parochial concerns about the location of a
proposed development within a given neighbourhood or community. From
the perspective of policymakers, given that political support for investments in renewable energy was widespread in the province, localized opposition was not principled, but rather narrow and selfish. Similarly, renewable energy advocates responded to the resistance with dismissal,
treating it as irrational and self-interested, and seemed to steel themselves against it. They essentially approached such local resistance as a
hurdle to surmount in the transition away from fossil fuels.35
In an important recent intervention, Karena Shaw and her collaborators offer a more robust account of the resistance struggles.36 Relying upon a multi-investigator study of community responses to new energy developments in four Canadian provinces, they conclude that “resistance is
heightened when communities are asked to relinquish certain landscape

32

Supra note 22.

33

Ibid, Preamble.
See ibid, s 5. See also O Reg 15/10 (designations re Section 5 of the Act). The Green
Energy and Green Economy Act, which resulted in the enactment of the Green Energy Act, 2009, was essentially omnibus legislation: its appendices modified sixteen
other laws, including the Planning Act and the Environmental Protection Act, by
creating exemptions to various requirements for projects designated as renewable
energy projects (see David McRobert, Julian Tennent-Riddell & Chad Walker, “Ontario’s Green Economy and Green Energy Act: Why a Well-Intentioned Law is
Mired in Controversy and Opposed by Rural Communities” (2016) 7:2 Renewable
Energy L & Policy Rev 91 at 91, n 1).

34

35

For a description of this general dynamic, see e.g. Derek Bell et al, “Re-visiting the ‘Social Gap’: Public Opinion and Relations of Power in the Local Politics of Wind Energy”
(2013) 22:1 Environmental Politics 115.

36

See Shaw et al, supra note 6.
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values or uses—to make sacrifices—in the absence of an institutional infrastructure that they are confident will protect their interests and values
over the long term.”37 The study identifies distributive justice as a key
concern of local communities: “communities were concerned that they
would bear often intensive social and ecological impacts of energy projects, while the benefits—the financial gains and new energy produced—
accrued elsewhere.”38 This focus on the “social patterning of costs and
benefits”, according to the authors, is tied primarily to the ownership
structure of the proposed project.39 As they state, “[t]he economic, governance, and regulatory arrangements underlying a project are important
factors that create or undermine distributional justice, shaping who benefits financially, who bears the risks, and how risks are managed.”40
In line with Shaw and her colleagues, we take the view that resistance
to green energy projects should not be dismissed so easily. In fact, the anti-wind and anti-solar movements that developed in southwestern Ontario
present some challenging questions for environmental justice praxis. We
organize these questions according to the different ways in which the people we encountered on the ground articulated their concerns with new
wind and solar projects. Accordingly, the presentation of claims by wind
and solar farm resisters occurs in three ways: environmental health concerns are advanced to contest the implementation of wind turbines
(Part II-A); concerns articulated in language consistent with food justice
critiques are levelled against solar farms based on the loss of arable land
and their interference with Indigenous food sovereignty (Part II-B); and
resistance to both wind and solar farms is articulated in the language of a
loss of landscape values (Part II-C). We consider each of these claims in
turn with a view to considering how critical environmental justice scholars should receive, conceive of, and theorize this resistance.

A. How Should We Receive Environmental Health Concerns?
Much of the resistance to wind turbines in southwestern Ontario is
organized around a claim of adverse health effects, controversially termed
“wind turbine syndrome”.41 We agree with Mark Winfield that any consid-

37

Ibid at 42.
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Ibid at 46.

39

Ibid at 43.

40

Ibid.
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For a collection of materials regarding the health effects of wind turbines, see Wind
Concerns Ontario, “Wind Energy and your Health” (2017), online: <www.
windconcernsontario.ca/health/>. See also Nina Pierpont, Wind Turbine Syndrome: A
Report on a Natural Experiment (Santa Fe: K-Selected Books, 2009).
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eration of the potential adverse health effects associated with wind turbines and other renewable energy projects should be undertaken in the
context of the devastating and proven health effects associated with conventional energy production, especially in relation to coal-fired utilities;
we also believe, however, that an environmental justice analysis requires
consideration of further distributional justice considerations.42
There are at least two ways of conceiving of the distribution of benefits
and burdens. There is a question of the distribution of the environmental
burdens associated with energy production, chiefly air pollution, and its
associated health costs,43 as between communities affected by conventional energy generation, such as the coal-fired utilities phased out from 2002
to 2014,44 and the communities affected by renewable energy projects intended to replace the electricity they generated. On a very general level, it
is possible to characterize the communities impacted by emissions from
coal-fired utilities as relatively marginalized: they include communities
such as Sarnia-Lambton and the Aamjiwnaang First Nation, the workingclass communities along Lake Erie, near the former Nanticoke generating
station and U.S. Steel, Rainy River, and Thunder Bay.
Again, in very general terms, then, we are able to say that it was primarily lower-income marginalized communities who disproportionately
bore the environmental health effects of coal-fired utilities, whereas it is
largely white middle-class property-owners who face the burdens associated with renewable energy projects. Taking the underlying environmental justice impulse to work toward a more equitable distribution of environmental burdens across society, we may judge this to be a welcome shift

42

Mark Winfield states:
Recent analyses attribute over 300 premature deaths per year in Ontario to
air pollution from coal-fired electricity (down from 660 per year when coal
use was at its height a few years ago). The upstream impacts and risks of
coal mining, ranging from the occupational risks of underground mining to
the destruction and consumption of entire landscapes via open-pit or mountaintop removal mining, must be considered as well.
... [T]he biophysical impacts of wind turbines, for which the evidence in the
formal literature is decidedly thin despite two decades of large-scale deployments in the densely populated landscapes of Western Europe, look rather
less serious (Mark Winfield, “Ontario’s Green Energy Debate: Three Points to
Consider” (10 March 2011), online: <marksw.blog.yorku.ca/blog/>).
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See generally Ontario Medial Association, The Illness Costs of Air Pollution in Ontario:
A Summary of Finding (Toronto: Ontario Medical Association, 2000).
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For a discussion of lessons learned from Ontario’s experience phasing out coal, see International Institute for Sustainable Development, “The End of Coal: Ontario’s Coal
Phase-Out” by Melissa Harris, Marisa Beck & Ivetta Gerasimchuk (Winnipeg: IISD,
2015), online: <www.iisd.org/>.
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on a broad policy level.45 Environmental justice scholars, however, are also concerned with a second way of conceiving the distributional question.
Here, we consider the benefits and burdens associated with individual
projects.46 We ask: Who benefits and who pays? And here, the difficulties
associated with the wind and solar projects resurface, raising compelling
questions about the ownership structures of the renewable energy projects, their impacts on local communities, and the degree of control local
people maintain in relation to their environments.
In this part, we focus on the narratives that emerged in our interviews
on the topic of adverse health effects associated with wind turbines. We
share the narratives of affected residents neither to validate nor to adjudicate these claims, but rather to interrogate the way in which critical
scholars receive them. We aim to develop a robust analytical approach to
the burdens associated with individual renewable energy projects, in line
with environmental justice frameworks. In particular, we strive to confront the striking similarities between the accounts of residents living
near wind turbines and the standard narrative that emerges from the
type of sacrifice zones more familiar to environmental justice communities, namely the downwinders: those fighting petrochemical or other fossil
fuel developments or extraction.
In the case of wind turbine syndrome, the residents’ stories begin as
most environmental justice stories do: with an exercise in popular epidemiology.47 Affected residents whom we interviewed in Norfolk County
stated that they experienced symptoms such as chronic headaches, sleeplessness, dizziness and loss of balance, tinnitus, vertigo, and migraines.48
The residents uniformly described initially dealing with these symptoms
themselves, then sharing their symptoms with family members, and finally deciding to reveal their symptoms to neighbours and the broader community. The process of sharing these experiences began with informal

45

This is admittedly an oversimplification. As Iris Marion Young famously notes, “[I]t is a
mistake to reduce social justice to distribution” (Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990 at 15). See also David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 103–28.
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globally, while the impacts are concentrated locally (see Richard Cowell, Gill Bristow &
Max Munday, “Acceptance, Acceptability and Environmental Justice: The Role of
Community Benefits in Wind Energy Development” (2011) 54:4 J Environmental Planning & Management 539 at 539–40).
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See generally Scott, “Monitors Now”, supra note 15.
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See Interviewees no 4 (28 July 2015), no 2 (27 July 2015), no 1 (27 July 2015).
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conversations with neighbours, and progressed to a comparing of symptoms and an attempt to construct a causal narrative based on considerations such as distance from a turbine, wind direction, geography, and materials used in house construction.49
For example, when asked how she came to believe that the turbines
were affecting her health, one resident stated:
It was when all eighteen turbines ... started turning at the same
time. I remember because it happened to be my son’s birthday ... and
over the next week or so ... my head felt like a block of concrete, my
ears were stuffed, and right now, I [can]not hear everything you’re
saying because my ears are stuffed. And I know that the wind has
been from the southeast and those are days when I’m grateful because when the winds [come] from the southeast or the south or
even the southwest, the turbulence all goes to the community on the
north side of the turbines. So for a little moment, or half a day or so,
I feel just a little bit better. When the winds are from the west and
you get all the turbines [going], it’s really very, very debilitating.50

When the resident was asked how long it took her to decide that the
health effects were related to the turbines, she replied,
No more than a couple of weeks. I went to my neighbour ... and ...
when the wind was from the northwest, he used to get pain in the
back of his neck, and we started comparing notes, and then we realized that when the wind turbines weren’t turning, all of these symptoms disappeared.51

When asked if she was recording her symptoms, the resident replied, “I
did do a little bit of a diary that I started in March 2010.”52 Relating how
she was forced to rent an apartment away from her home to escape the
turbines, she continued:
So that was an experiment that [X]’s mom and one of our other
neighbour’s, [Y], who lived down the road a little further [did]. We
rented an apartment in [Z], which is forty-five kilometres from here
... so I was doing a crossover-type of experiment—I knew what I was
doing, but I wasn’t going to sort of cave in and be a recorder of my
own demise.53

Another resident explained:
Eventually, you start to gain some familiarity with the sound and
maybe your ears are tuning in to a lower frequency sound and you’re

49

See ibid.
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saying, “[are] my bones vibrating, what’s going on here?” And then
at some point, it’s like ... it’s very obvious that the wind turbines are
the cause. And when I started to feel resonance in my body ... some
nights are much worse than others ... I have to get up to go to work
in the morning and it’s [one in the morning] and I can’t sleep and my
body’s vibrating and I can hear them. It’s an emergency, a crisis ...
[and] we don’t have six years to argue this out as we figure [it] out.54

Yet another resident reported:
My husband’s tinnitus has gotten much worse; he has it a lot more
often and a lot more severe, too. So he wakes up in the middle of the
night and can’t get back to sleep, and he’s up and down and then it
rings throughout the day lots of times too. It always seems to be
when the wind is up and the wind turbines are going faster.55

When asked why they think the turbines are not affecting everyone in the
community, one resident replied: “Number one, I feel like there may be a
lot of denial.”56 Other community members indicated that they thought
families who had signed contracts with the wind companies were not in a
position to admit that they were sick, due to confidentiality clauses.
As residents struggled to make sense of these symptoms, they described multiple neighbours along the same road experiencing vertigo for
the first time.57 They collected stories of others across the county experiencing heart palpitations, nausea, migraines, trouble sleeping, and “feeling vibrations”. Multiple residents told us that the ringing in their ears
disappeared when they left their homes and communities, and returned
when they came back. One resident recounted:
My youngest daughter ... we had to keep her out of school, something was wrong with her, she felt dizzy and faint; her legs and arms
were numb, she said she had a bad headache, was nauseated. Later
that night, and right through the next day, I heard and felt the noise
and vibrations from the wind turbines more prominently than usual.58

When compared with the serious environmental health effects which
often arise from living in the vicinity of a petrochemical complex or downstream of a major oil or gas development—such as cancers, reproductive
and developmental disorders, and chronic respiratory illness—the health
complaints of residents in southwestern Ontario may seem relatively minor. It is clear that adverse health effects associated with wind turbines
54

Interviewee no 4, supra note 48.
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are not uniformly experienced. For the residents who experience them,
however, they are described as completely “life-changing” and “debilitating”, disrupting work, family life, and relationships.59 Further, while they
may differ slightly in kind, the pattern by which they emerge follows a
formula that environmental justice scholars will find familiar.60
Consider the early grassroots struggles that are largely credited for
giving rise to the environmental justice movement in the United States:
the clusters of illness which were finally tied to the underground plumes
of toxic contamination in Love Canal, New York, in the early 1970s, were
first brought to light by Lois Gibbs and the other now-celebrated “housewives” who walked up and down streets to gather data like this.61 The
largely Black community of Warren County, North Carolina took up these
methods in their bid to demonstrate the link between their children’s illnesses and the toxic waste dumped along their roadways in the early
1980s.62 The pattern repeats in Canada: along Fredrick Street in the Sydney Tar Ponds on Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia,63 on the Aamjiwnaang
First Nation reserve adjacent to Canada’s Chemical Valley,64 and on
Township Road 842, downwind of the Peace River oil sands.65 As Jason
Corburn demonstrates in Street Science, a common element to these stories is that evidence collected through exercises in popular epidemiology is
initially discounted and rejected by formal scientific and legal authorities.
In many of these struggles, however, the popular account is subsequently validated. The point is that environmental justice activists are
quite familiar with legal and regulatory decision-making processes discounting “evidence that is more informal, experiential, tacit, and explicitly
value laden.”66 In fact, the thrust of much environmental justice scholar59
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60
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ship has been to explicitly counter this dynamic, recognizing that it is
fuelled by the tactics of “manufactured uncertainty” employed by “big tobacco”, “big chem”, and “big oil” over the years, largely undertaken with
the aim of delaying regulatory restrictions on their products.67
In contrast, Luke Cole and Sheila Foster’s ground-breaking work on
the environmental justice movement, From the Ground Up, forcefully argues that affected residents must “speak for themselves”, their expertise
must be valued, and they must be believed.68 The notion of “popular epidemiology” is based on the idea of these residents talking to their neighbours, comparing symptoms, and compiling notes.69 When individuals
come together to challenge a development in their community, typically
put forward by outsiders—in this case, by renewable energy multinationals perceived to be trying to buy off landowners one by one with secretive
contracts preventing them from speaking out70—a key question for critical
environmental justice scholars must be: How should we receive these
claims?
Should our attitude towards the claims be based primarily on the
characteristics of the residents complaining (i.e., asking whether they are
marginalized, racialized, or oppressed). Or does the critique, which we
have developed through our analyses of how data, power, and authority
are mutually constituted in environmental justice struggles, instead
command us to approach all “truth claims” differently, regardless of
whether the mobilizing residents are (as they are in this case) largely
white, middle-class property-owners? Does this critique require us to see
those claims as “situated and contingent”,71 coming from a community of
knowers with shared beliefs and experiences, and as having a basic validity, even though they are not grounded in conventional scientific
knowledge?
As is perhaps not surprising, tribunals in Ontario and state institutions across Canada have not received the claims in this way. Instead,
67
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they have dismissed the adverse health claims framed in terms of wind
turbine syndrome on the basis of a lack of credible evidence.72 In a recent
report, Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer of Health concluded, “[T]he scientific evidence available to date does not demonstrate a direct causal link
between wind turbine noise and adverse health effects.”73 Ontario’s Environmental Review Tribunal heard a series of cases related to health concerns associated with wind turbines between about 2011 and 2015, and
uniformly rejected claims of adverse health effects.74 In Drennan v. Ontario (Ministry of the Environment) (the “K2 wind decision”), the tribunal
stated:
[T]he Appellants did not provide professional medical opinions to diagnose the health complaints from the post-turbine witnesses and to
establish a causal link between those complaints and wind turbines
noise or noise from transformers. As importantly, the Tribunal has
the benefit of the testimony of Drs. Mundt, McCunney and Moore
that reinforce previous Tribunal findings that the post-turbine witnesses need to be properly diagnosed by a medical professional and
that there is no reliable evidence to demonstrate that the Project will
cause serious physical or any other serious harm.75

Many of those cases closely followed an authoritative study on the
health effects of wind turbine exposure from Health Canada released in
2014.76 This study found no evidence to support a link between exposure
to wind turbine noise and any of the self-reported illnesses (e.g., dizziness,
tinnitus, and migraines) and chronic conditions (e.g., heart disease, high
blood pressure, and diabetes) and no association between multiple
measures of stress (e.g., hair cortisol, blood pressure, heart rate, and disrupted sleep) and exposure to wind turbine noise.77 On the topic of “an-
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noyance levels”, perhaps unsurprisingly, statistically significant relationships were found between increasing wind turbine noise and the prevalence of reporting high annoyance.78 These associations were found with
annoyance due to noise, vibrations, blinking lights, shadows, and visual
impacts from wind turbines. Interestingly, however, annoyance was said
to be significantly lower among the 110 participants who received personal direct or indirect benefits of having wind turbines in the area.79
All of this leads some critics to argue that Ontario simply made mistakes in its implementation of the Green Energy Act, 2009. As an advocate
for Wind Concerns Ontario stated: “Wind power can work ... but plunking
[turbines] down, right next to communities and next to homes and
schools, is not the right idea.”80 For these people, siting was the crucial
thing that went wrong. For others, the failure to reimagine ownership
structures and obtain community buy-in was the problem.81 This is where
the “annoyance level” findings are interesting. On this kind of environmental justice framing of distributive justice, it is that the risks and costs
are falling on residents and the benefits are all accruing somewhere else
that is crucial. Think of the anti-pipeline slogan, “All Risk, No Reward.”82
When residents sense this, they fight it—and the fact that the project will
produce energy that is ‘renewable’ seems to do little to mitigate these sentiments.

B. How Should We Handle the Competing Claims to Land?
A second theme was observed primarily in the resistance to solar
farms. How should we adjudicate claims to land as between those who
want to preserve it for food production (broadly construed) and those who
would use it for solar power generation? From an environmental justice
framework, we are familiar with conflicts over land and space as they typically play out between industrial and residential uses, or even sometimes
between “green space” and “industrial development”. We have less experi78
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ence and analysis addressing competing demands framed in “justice”
terms.
Communities across Ontario experienced a “solar building boom” in
the summer of 2014.83 Credit has been directed at supportive provincial
policies, in particular the Feed-In Tariff Program launched in conjunction
with the Green Energy Act, 2009, which offered high, fixed prices for electricity generated from large-scale solar projects and other renewable
sources.84 Although aspects of the program have now been discontinued, it
produced more than seventy “huge, ground-level projects, sometimes covering vast tracts of land.”85 Proponents rave about the uncontroversial nature of solar generation. According to a small-town mayor, “Solar does
[not] present the same kind of issues as wind.”86 And as an industry consultant claims, “It sits there, it’s quiet, and it is not very visible because it
is flat on the ground.”87 But other commentators concede that there are
“legitimate concerns from residents who live near planned solar farms,”
pointing to “the hum from inverters, the glare from panels, and worries
over water, wildlife and the loss of farmland.”88 These concerns are widely
regarded as “remedied” through more recent interventions, including
larger setbacks of panels from roadways, waterways, property lines, and
the like, as well as the provincial government’s prohibition of the installation of solar farms on high-quality farm lands.89

83

Richard Blackwell, “Solar Power Surging to Forefront of Canadian Energy”, The Globe
and Mail (26 July 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> [Blackwell, “Solar Power”]. See also Richard Blackwell, “Going Green: Does Ontario’s Energy Shift Have the
Power to Sustain Itself?”, The Globe and Mail (10 July 2015), online: <www.
globeandmail.com>.

84

See Green Energy Act, 2009, supra note 22, Preamble, ss 5, 11. See also IESO, “Feed-in
Tariff Program”, supra note 22.

85

While the cancellation of the Large Renewable Procurement program was announced in
September 2016, the FIT and microFIT programs remain in place (see Ontario,
Ministry of Energy, News Release, “Ontario Suspends Large Renewable Energy
Procurement” (27 September 2016), online: Government of Ontario Newsroom <news.
ontario.ca> [Ontario, “Ontario Suspends Procurement”]). See also Independent
Electricity Service Operator, “Feed-in Tariff Program” (19 December 2016), online:
IESO <www.ieso.ca/sector-participants/feed-in-tariff-program/news-and-updates/fit-5application-summary>).

86

Blackwell, “Solar Power”, supra note 83.

87

Ibid.

88

Ibid.

89

Ibid. But see Konrad Yakabuski, “The Darker Side of Solar Power”, Editorial, The
Globe and Mail (27 May 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> (“[t]he industry
doesn’t talk much, or at all, about the downsides of manufacturing solar panels or
where all these panels will end up when they conk out. Think of how much toxic waste
is generated by consumer electronics and you get a small inkling of what a world lit

882 (2017) 62:3 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

In exploring the more trenchant criticisms of large-scale solar projects
in our qualitative research, we found that resistance to solar farms in
southwestern Ontario was often grounded in concerns about the use of
arable lands for purposes other than growing food and serving environmental and ecological functions. Certain articulations of these concerns
appear consistent with “food justice” activism as it has been mounted by
farmers and growers. In an interview, a former farmer articulated “a
philosophical objection to using solar generation on crop land.”90 While
acknowledging that “wind has been very controversial in the County,” he
noted that “[t]hrough our Federation of Agriculture, we have consistently
objected to using farm land for solar panels.” Going on to state that he
could not “see any reason why they would need to bulldoze [farm fields]
into a sterile expanse of soil,” he added:
[M]arginal land is not useless land. Even if it’s marginal land, ... it
performs a very useful environmental function. There’s no such
thing as useless land. ... We must be very concerned about what we
do ... in terms of changing the landscape from a natural environment, whether it’s for farming purposes or environmental reasons,
ya know. Both are legitimate led uses to be sure.91

As another resident commented,
[W]hen you bring a solar installation into a rural area, you basically
destroy that soil. You destroy it, because they will dig down, they
will dig up all the topsoil, they will put three feet of heavy gauge
gravel, and you just can’t re-build that. ... They were offering ridiculous prices to take advantage of some of these wide open spaces with
southern exposure like we have here, and I think the [Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs] put the kibosh on that
pretty quick. They said, “Oh no no. You can’t come down here and
destroy class I, II, and III soils. You’ll have to make a case that the
land is good for nothing, it’s totally marginal. Even then, it’s discouraged because the [Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry]
and conservation groups, environmental groups, would like to see
that kind of land returned to nature, wildlife, pollinator habitat,
[and] reforestation.92

with solar power, and the batteries needed to store their energy, might look like”). For a
response, see Merran Smith, “Solar Power Isn’t Perfect, But It’s the Best We’ve Got”,
The Huffington Post Canada (31 May 2015), online: <www.huffingtonpost.ca>
(“[s]omething has to keep the lights on, and there’s simply no such thing as a clean, reliable, cost-effective—and 100-percent pollution-free—electricity source. It doesn’t exist.
This rule applies whether you’re considering fossil fuels, nuclear, or renewable energy.
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In contrast to wind farms, which “take very little land out of production,”
the retired farmer decried the use of arable land for solar generation and
the stronger protection afforded to “wood lands” over agricultural lands.
In his words,
If we look at the development of solar farms in [the] county, wood
lots are protected. Farm land is on a lower scale than wood lands
[laughs]. That shows you where our priorities are as a society. We
take our food for granted, but we protect our [laughs] environment
before we protect our food producing resources.93

These arguments have resonances with the Farmers Feed Cities campaign, another prominent example of farmer-land food justice. Launched
in 2005, and ultimately stewarded by the Grain Farmers of Ontario, the
lobbying front and consumer awareness campaign sought to build support
for the plight of farmers across the province. In the form of lawn signs,
bumper stickers and window decals, and backed by farmers’ political protests and convergences, the campaign portrayed farmers in heroic fashion
to urban dwellers in a period of heightened interest in the development of
“local” and “sustainable” food initiatives. Yet, the campaign reinforced certain misconceptions about the shifting nature of farming practices. Those
misconceptions often invoke, as one resident put it, the
classic Old-MacDonald family farm, where there’s a diversity of
things done on the farm. There’s a lot of people who have this perception that that’s the way agriculture is still done in southern Ontario, and it’s not. I mean, agriculture now is very much done on an
industrial scale, in a sophisticated fashion.94

Indeed, the Farmers Feed Cities campaign glossed over many issues of
contemporary importance in southwestern Ontario. The campaign said
little about agro-food consolidation and integration into corporate supply
chains (indeed, in a certain respect, it celebrated this); the injustices of
hunger and starvation in cities;95 the gendered nature of food provisioning
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and social reproduction;96 white privilege and racism in agro-food production, provisioning, and planning;97 the “battle fields” of migrant agricultural labour and growers;98 wider ecological injustices, whether caused by
fossil fuel dependency in inputs and greenhouse gas outputs, monocultural crop production, soil erosion, aquifer depletion, or a combination of
these; or food sovereignty at the intersections of settler colonialism and
capitalist imperialism.99 As these considerations suggest, alternatives to
narrowly conceived farmer-centred conceptions of food justice exist.
As an example, in our research we also encountered resistance to renewable energy projects articulated in the language of Indigenous rights
and food sovereignty. In particular, members of the Six Nations of the
Grand River expressed concerns surrounding the possible violation of
their hunting rights caused by the disruption of wildlife habitat and migration routes, which would result from plans to build a vast solar installation on their traditional territory.100 “No one on this tribunal will be liv-

tics of Urban Metabolism (London: Routledge, 2006) 129; Nik Heynen, Hilda E Kurtz &
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See Susan Braedley & Meg Luxton, “Competing Philosophies: Neoliberalism and Challenges of Everyday Life” in Susan Braedley & Meg Luxton, eds, Neoliberalism and Everyday Life (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) 3 at 14. On social reproduction more broadly, see generally Kate Bezanson & Meg Luxton, eds, Social Reproduction: Feminist Political Economy Challenges Neo-Liberalism (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2006).
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ing on this land. No one will know the effects until 40 years from now,”
stated a Six Nations band member who gave evidence at an Environmental Review Tribunal hearing on the Samsung Grand Renewable Energy
Park.101 Members of the band engaged in resistance actions such as putting up “no trespassing” signs on the land and uprooting surveying stakes
installed by the renewable energy giant, Samsung. Another resident explained: “I have no respect for Samsung. They have no respect for the
wildlife. All they care about is the money. ... It’s pretty sad that we would
give up our children’s rights for a dollar.”102
The concerns expressed to us by the Indigenous community members
we interviewed emphasized that Six Nations people live and rely heavily
on the land.103 The presence of the wildlife on the territory is critical to the
continuation of their traditional practices, to their ability to transfer those
skills and values to the next generations, and to their own food needs.104
Residents indicated that they were trying to “bring that attention to the
connection to the land, the medicines,” so that they could fulfill responsibilities to “take care of those animals that we are relatives of.”105 But
these community members were frustrated that in the tribunal process,
they were unable to meet the demands for certain types of “knowledge”
and “expertise” that would be valued by the decision makers. As one resident put it,
We were supposed to be able to put forward the effects that these
windmills and solar panels would have on the environment. ... [T]he
thing that we found out is that we don’t have the education to back
that up; however, we do have a cultural component and heritage and
ceremonies. ... So we have a different understanding from what they
have. Our understanding has more of a spiritual aspect. The downside is we weren’t allowed to use our wampums, we weren’t allowed
to use our treaties, to use our laws. ... [I]t was all based on what the
negative effects would be if those [projects] went up. And they’re not
up and they’re still fairly new, so how can anybody really prove
that?106

Critical scholars have built on the close affinities between food justice
and environmental justice to posit nuanced accounts that can incorporate
101
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these tensions.107 Carmen Gonzalez adopts a “tripartite definition of food
justice consisting of ecologically sustainable food production, equitable access to food and food-producing resources, and democratic local and national control over food and agricultural policy.”108 Food justice in this conception aims to secure “the right of communities to grow, sell, and consume healthy, nutritious, affordable, and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sustainable methods, and their right to democratically determine their own food and agriculture policies.”109 The reference to Indigenous law made by the Six Nations’ resident above highlights
its ongoing subordination to the colonial laws applied by courts and tribunals, and thus underscores the complexity in notions of food justice which
take the elements of culture and self-determination seriously. The articulation of resistance to solar farms in southwestern Ontario thus mobilizes
concerns which expose valid questions and serious tensions between environmental justice, energy justice, and food justice, broadly conceived. To
dismiss such concerns as NIMBYism is to dodge the difficult questions
which critical scholars will need to confront in analyzing the resistance to
the transition from fossil fuels.

C. How Should We Think about the “Right to Landscape”?
Finally, and perhaps most profoundly, we encountered green energy
resistance framed in terms of a right to the landscape. This third type of
claim involves the defence of landscape values as residents articulate a
connection to land and an affection for a landscape seen as “theirs by
right”. Whereas the charge of NIMBYism is commonly (and perhaps most
easily) launched when opposition to renewable energy projects is based on

107
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aesthetic concerns, it is possible to instead situate these articulations
within the emerging idea of a “right to landscape”.110 The European Union’s 2000 European Landscape Convention111 and UNESCO’s 2012 Florence Declaration on Landscape112 demonstrate heightened concern for
landscape degradation and a contemporary push for the safeguard of
landscapes. In these accounts, landscape pertains to “the expression of the
relationship between people and environment” with a recognition of
“landscape [as] a common good” and “the right to the landscape [as] a
human necessity.”113 That said, there has been very little work on the
right to landscape situated within wider concerns about “just transition”114 and global environmental or climate justice.115
To be sure, a core dimension of the residents’ landscape claims turns
on the perceived aesthetic impact of renewable energy projects. In the
words of one resident,
[Solar farms are] hideous. [The solar companies] are not doing anything to buffer them visually. And people are asking, ‘what are you
doing to our beautiful county?’ No, we’re not going to stand for this.
And to a lesser extent there’s that same feeling with regard to industrial wind turbines. They’re a blight on the landscape – that’s how
people feel.116

As the resident continued,
It’s that people down here—what we see with respect to our landscape—find the solar installations really ugly and intrusive. Like I
said, they go in, and they just totally scarify a gigantic piece of land
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and they dig up all the topsoil and they put down all this gravel and
then they throw down these black panels and they all have a giant
fence around them with razor wire on the top. We have beautiful
countryside down here, there’s resistance to that.117

But the resistance to green energy projects we encountered in southwestern Ontario raises questions more fundamental than mere concerns about
aesthetics. How should we receive claims by residents that renewable energy projects are interfering with the landscape, when those people articulate a profound connection to and affection for a particular landscape?
When perceived as a “right to landscape”, articulations of a severed
connection to a valued landscape may incorporate, to varying degrees, entrenched notions of private property. In this respect, “[q]uestions of property are questions related to who can—and cannot—make legitimate
claims to occupy, appropriate, or alienate landscapes.”118 These notions
are present in a response from a resident who noted that “land ownership—it’s a touchy subject for a lot of farmers. Ya know they identify with
the ownership of their land. In many cases [it’s] their retirement funds.”119
Yet, the lament for the loss of a landscape can also have the potential of
affirming the attachments of “non-owners” to land and for extending
rights to a collective that may even challenge contemporary capitalist
commitments to what is possible on a landscape.120 It is in this context
that we might receive the same resident’s remarks that “the attachment
to a land holding is not nearly as pronounced as it was, even a generation
ago.”121
Here, we might also consider the perspectives which address how
landscape intersects with everyday social life. Attentive to the naturalization of social relations through landscape, critical geographers have focused on landscape’s encoding of meaning, relations, practices, and histories. These accounts view landscape as “driven by real people and their ef-
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forts.”122 But as Don Mitchell and Carrie Breitbach ask, “Which social relations make landscape’s forms?”123 On these terms, as Mitchell states
elsewhere, the crucial query is not “whose landscape?”, but rather “landscape for whom?”124 Claims surrounding the loss of landscape value, as
Mitchell has demonstrated in the fields of California,125 often promote exclusionary tendencies. There are racialized, gendered, classed, and laboured implications of “spatially unjust landscape processes.”126 As an example, in southwestern Ontario, despite the central importance of migrant labour to the harvesting of crops—work which is undertaken by migrant farmworkers from Mexico and the Caribbean who enter Canada
under the exploitative terms of the seasonal agricultural workers program127—the right to landscape most often articulated is one grounded in
white, “propertied citizenship”.128 Sometimes, this notion goes as far as
seeming to strive for a right to a landscape that does not include racialized bodies at all, notwithstanding their centrality to the functioning of
agricultural production in Norfolk County.129 Further, it is clear that the
pressing settler-colonial imperative of erasing and denying Indigenous
sovereignty plays a major role in structuring prevailing patterns of agricultural land use, access, and control.130
On this understanding of landscape, we can see a complex relationship
between people and place. In this relationship, following Don Mitchell and
other critical geographers, place is shaped by the strivings of ordinary
122
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people and infused within social relationships and processes of racialization, gender, class, and colonization. Rural identities in the global North,
in particular, are shaped by “place and property relations” in such a way
as to entrench existing privilege.131 We thus acknowledge that a right to
landscape can work in a way which reinforces norms of propertied citizenship and whiteness, and denies Indigenous sovereignty. As we show in the
next part, however, we also hold on to its potential for countering the
dominance of private property by exposing how this legal framework fails
to fully capture the set of relations that people can have with land and
landscape.132 As Indigenous legal scholars such as John Borrows and others have argued for years, articulations of an alternative set of relations to
land and landscape, claims that privilege “place” over property, would
emphasize relations of responsibility and reciprocity with land and landscapes, rather than “rights” to them.133

III. Situating Resistance to Green Energy
As we have demonstrated, the characterization of green energy resistance in Ontario as pure NIMBYism unfairly, and sometimes erroneously, portrays critics of renewable energy projects as irrational and narrowly self-interested actors. Even when the resistance has been recognized as grounded in a place-based attachment to landscape, this too is
brushed off as instrumental. These framings not only work in service of
state interventions to limit public participation and local control over decision making, but, we suggest, may establish troubling precedents as we
move forward in the transition from fossil extractivism and limit the
transformative potential of the green energy economy.
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Our preliminary results lend further support to other empirical findings that local community resistance to renewable energy projects, while
framed as NIMBYism, “often articulates with other, broader concerns” 134
about governance, as well as procedural and distributive justice. In this
respect, an engagement with the “sacrifice zones” framework is apt. In
examining resistance to renewable energy through the sacrifice zone lens
we strive to sharpen the analytical tools—and ultimately the practices—of
environmental justice. How, then, should we receive, conceive of, and theorize this resistance? Recalling that we began from the premise that environmental justice requires us to consider not just whether we tackle climate change by transitioning from fossil extractivism, but also how we
undertake the transition, we argue that accounting for the distributive effects of renewable energy projects must occur with a view to shifting power relations and social dynamics. As demonstrated with respect to the adverse health effects claims, failure to do so mimics the very tactics of
“manufacturing uncertainty”, which the environmental justice movement
has struggled to contest.
As the previous sections make clear, we cannot wholly accept the “sacrifice zone” characterization of the renewable energy resistance that we
encountered in southwestern Ontario. Still, an engagement with it helps
to clarify and sharpen our understanding of the challenges inherent in
transitioning away from fossil extractivism. In each of the three registers
of renewable energy resistance identified, we found meaningful and substantive concerns that expose deep tensions within green energy enthusiasm. Nor do we believe we can dismiss the resistance merely on the basis
of the characteristics of the people or communities mounting it. Instead,
in taking the resistance seriously, we need to deepen appreciation of how
the claims are infused with and cannot be detached from broader relations of production and consumption. In line with Laura Pulido, we would
not want a narrow emphasis on “race” in the environmental justice
movement to prevent scholarly interrogation of these contemporary conflicts, which can advance nuanced understandings of how racism and settler colonialism interact with the forces of capitalist production and consumption to “create highly oppressive circumstances.”135
A goal of environmental justice activists is sometimes to “even out”
burdens or sacrifices across a more diverse range of communities and,
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where necessary, impose them on more affluent or relatively privileged
peoples and communities “for the greater good.”136 These distributive justice concerns, as Shaw and her colleagues found in their recent empirical
study of opposition to renewable energy projects across Canada, took on a
particular tenor in the context of an urban-rural political divide in Ontario:
Urban Ontario receives the bulk of the energy produced while
rural Ontario endures the impacts of wind energy infrastructure.
Despite repeated claims of economic development opportunities and
increased levels of local employment in rural areas, community
members described their sense that few tangible benefits in the form
of jobs or community economic development have transpired, beyond
landowners leasing their property for turbines. Rather, host communities expressed the feeling that multinational developers and institutional investors have accrued most of the economic benefits.137

The Green Energy Act, 2009’s transfer of decision-making authority
from local municipalities to the province exacerbated the urban-rural division.138 Opportunities for public involvement prescribed by the province
included modest and “formulaic open houses in which communities responded to plans after they were formed. There were no opportunities for
community members to collaboratively discuss the benefits and risks of
hosting wind turbines, or have any material influence over the outcome.”139 This situation left many municipalities upset at the province’s
aggressive promotion of wind power at the expense of local control, with
few options other than to declare themselves “unwilling hosts”.140 Municipal disputes also emerged over solar power, albeit in far less pronounced
and protracted terms.141
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In the end, to the extent that the provincial green energy agenda attempted to foist sacrifices on segments of rural Ontario, it had limited
success. Although the struggle is still in progress, it is evident that the
Ontario government has recently been forced to backtrack on its initial
green energy policy, in what commentators are referring to as a green energy “reversal”.142 While we do not credit the dramatic policy shift solely to
the types of resistance we describe here, we do believe it played some role
in repelling burdens—but not before certain rural residents and communities experienced health, arable land, food sovereignty, and landscape
value effects. The capacity of residents to re-shift these burdens underscores their enduring privilege.143 In this respect, environmental burdens,
even in a green energy economy, continue to flow along familiar gradients.
What Lerner says distinguishes residents of sacrifice zones under extractivism—the more classic “downwinders” of environmental justice stories—
is that they are “required to make disproportionate health and economic
sacrifices that more affluent people can avoid.”144 That those resisting
green energy projects in Ontario were not, by and large, racialized or
marginalized low-income communities is significant, and perhaps helps to
explain their recent successes.145 In fact, as explored in the previous part,
the relative political power of those mounting resistance might be attributed to their strategic deployment of whiteness and propertied citizenship.
Anna Willow has argued recently that, increasingly, people everywhere are contending with environmental changes “that they did not authorize and do not benefit from.”146 We believe that our analysis here
demonstrates that these feelings are strongly articulated in the language
of environmental justice, regardless of whether the communities themselves can be characterized as racialized, marginalized or oppressed. Willow argues that scholars have “overlooked the potential of environmental
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degradation to indicate groups’ changing status,” mapping, in her study of
white anti-fracking activists in Ohio, the articulations of environmental
injustice “among those for whom disempowerment and vulnerability are
new experiences.”147 We agree with Willow that investigating the impacts
of uninvited environmental change on relatively privileged communities
may “expose ongoing structural shifts.”148
Environmental justice scholarship understands the pollution burdens
on poor and racialized communities to stem primarily from structural inequities, such as a lack of “political and financial resources to challenge ...
siting decisions.”149 Environmental justice activism has thus been couched
in terms of “environmentalism of the poor”150 and contrasted with the
“[e]cology of [a]ffluence”,151 which Ramachandra Guha describes as a “luxury, leisure-time concern,”152 often focused on the “conservation of remote,
wild landscapes.”153 This kind of environmentalism is more likely to be
characterized as affection for “particular representations of nature,”154 as
opposed to stemming from meaningful contact and interactions with the
land in question. However, as Leah Horowitz argues:
[N]ot all the environmental concerns of the relatively affluent result
from boredom and self-indulgence ... [T]hey, too, may oppose the siting of environmentally destructive facilities or infrastructure in their
own neighborhood. When such concerns are expressed by the middle
or upper classes, particularly in the developed world, they are often
contemptuously labeled NIMBY (not in my backyard) and glossed

147
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over as attempts to resist a LULU (locally unwanted land use). Studies of NIMBY have uncovered its complexity, noting that no instance
‘‘branded with this name’’ perfectly fits its definition.155

Maarten Wolsink and others have insisted that, rather than resulting
from selfishness and instrumentalism, this resistance is often about “equity and fairness”,156 or “place attachment”157 and its associated identities.
In other words, those engaged in activism characterized as NIMBYism
and those engaged in environmental justice struggles “often share similar
concerns despite their obviously different socio-economic conditions.”158 In
this respect, we join with political ecologists such as James McCarthy who
might emphasize the similarities rather than the differences between
these groups.159 McCarthy notes how rurality in the contemporary global
North is constructed around an identity of marginality; that is, rural residents often “believe themselves to be marginal.”160 They sense that their
populations are shrinking relative to cities; that they are experiencing a
declining political significance. McCarthy notes that they often express
the sense that their communities are “run by and for external interests”:161 we certainly heard in our interviews several different articulations of the sentiment that “all those environmentalists down in Toronto
should have turbines in their own backyards, if they like renewable energy so much.” As Van Wagner notes, the “working landscapes of rural places” are often construed as “a potential sacrifice zone where resource demands can be satisfied.”162
A meaningful engagement with renewable energy resistance demands
an analytical framework which allows us to receive those claims based on
adverse health effects, competing land uses, and landscape values within
an understanding of how each is shaped by social processes and relations
of racialization, class, and settler colonialism. In particular, we must pre155
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serve the ability to take seriously the counter-hegemonic potential of the
right to landscape claim, grounded in a “sense of place”, in appropriate
situations or contexts. In thinking through the counter-hegemonic potential of that claim, we are reminded of James McCarthy’s comment that
“[not] everyone is always fully aware or supportive of the critiques of capitalism that might be implicit in their particular environmental concerns.”163
The notion of narrow economic self-interest underlying the NIMBYism
construction also invites the idea that community benefits would mitigate
concerns, but in fact scholarship on community ownership of renewable
energy projects downplays the role of economic gain in garnering support:
Derek Bell and his colleagues found that it was as much about local control and involvement as it was about any potential profits.164 Similarly,
according to Willow, “uninvited environmental change transforms people’s
understandings of and relationships to the natural world,” leading to feelings of disempowerment and vulnerability.165 After describing his own experience of devastating health effects and ruined relationships with
neighbours and friends he attributes to a wind turbine, one resident we
interviewed sighed and stated, “I think really what it boils down to is the
unfairness of the process.”166 For us, this comment goes to the notion of
“local control” meant to be cast aside by the NIMBYism label. Those demanding local control over landscapes are, in some ways, seeking a radical departure from the prevailing capitalist organization of renewable energy development. It is crucial to emphasize that, in the context of Ontario, the transition to renewables is fuelling the trend away from public
ownership of energy-generating assets.167 Thus, at the end of the day, as
much as the government would construe this resistance as conservative
and self-serving, it is presenting obstacles for capital, and perhaps even
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acts as a countervailing force to neo-liberalizing trends, even though it is
not “explicitly oriented against the deepening of capitalist relations”.168

Conclusion
The resistance to green energy projects in southwestern Ontario presents some challenging questions for environmental justice scholars and
activists. In considering how to receive claims about adverse health effects
of wind power (i.e., “wind turbine syndrome”), we argued that our attitude
toward the claims should be based less on the identity of the residents
complaining, and more on an analysis of power relations and social dynamics in relation to knowledge and expertise. In considering how we
should adjudicate claims to land as between those who want to preserve it
for food production, and those who would use it for solar power generation, we called for the development of nuanced accounts of food justice
that can take these tensions into consideration. With respect to Indigenous peoples’ struggles for food sovereignty, we argued that the settlercolonial context must be considered and the ongoing subordination of Indigenous law to colonial law is a pressing matter of concern for environmental justice scholars.
Finally, and most profoundly, we considered how we should receive
claims by residents that renewable energy projects are interfering with
the “landscape”. When people articulate a connection to land and an affection for a landscape, a complicated set of questions come into view for environmental justice scholars. Recognizing that these claims may have exclusionary and even racist tendencies, we can also see their potential for
affirming the attachments of non-owners to land and for extending rights
to a collective that may challenge entrenched capitalist conceptions of
what is possible on a landscape. To return to the Site C example raised at
the outset of this article, it is clear that, in that context, the climate imperative—to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—is now a critical settlerstate imperative. And the Site C dam, the displacement and dispossession
of Indigenous communities, is justified on climate grounds. Here, the severance of links between land and livelihood and the dismissal of collective
claims for the preservation of a landscape that has sustained a people,
since time immemorial, clearly demonstrates the need to preserve the
possibility that those claims can be heard by environmental justice scholars, as we confront the “voracious appetite for resources and land”169 that
is inherent in not only fossil extractivism, but in the green energy economy as well.
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We conclude that resistance to green energy projects as it is emerging
on the ground should not be so easily dismissed as mere NIMBYism. At
the same time, the approach to renewable energy governance that emerges from this study of resistance in southwestern Ontario reveals “modes of
regulation that are simultaneously effective in reducing carbon emissions
while not threatening the power structures that have caused the problems
in the first place.”170 As mentioned, the growth in renewables fuelled by
the Green Energy Act in Ontario corresponds with a greater proportion of
energy generating assets under private control. The counterhegemonic
potential at the core of green energy resistance, then, derives from its
troubling of the profit-driven incentive structures and lack of participatory engagement that characterize green energy enthusiasm in its current
form. Naomi Klein, in This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate, states that sacrifice zones in an extractivist economy are those
“places that, to their extractors, somehow don’t count and therefore can be
poisoned, drained, or otherwise destroyed, for the supposed greater good
of economic progress.”171 She acknowledges that this logic “predate[s] industrial-scale extraction of fossil fuels.”172 Our point is that it may outlast
fossil-capitalism as well, if a narrow focus on climate justice, or a shallow
conception of the green economy, prevents us from seeing the fundamental reimagining of our economies that needs to take place. In seeking to
preserve possibilities in the green energy economy for “true politics[—
]antagonism, deep dissent, [and] the space for the imagination [and articulation] of genuine alternatives”173—we feel it is important to take resistance seriously.
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